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Abstract. This paper examines the anti-money laundering systems of Australia, 
the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the United Kingdom (UK) and the United 
States of America (USA), the extent to which they have implemented the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations, and how compliance 
with these recommendations is affected by local cultural and economic factors. 
The paper makes use of FATF evaluation reports to compare the countries’ 
compliance; it examines some of the underlying cultural considerations and 
culture-specific ethical issues that affect the extent of compliance, and how 
cultural and ethical considerations may affect good governance. The findings 
indicate that the UK and the USA are the most advanced with regards to their 
compliance with the FATF recommendations and Australia and the UAE less 
so. The UAE is in particular found to be least compliant. We relate this finding 
to previous work on how a country’s legal and financial systems develop in line 
with its religion, culture and socio-economic situation, and examine how such 
local factors have affected the UAE’s financial and anti-money laundering and 
combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) systems. This research will 
be of interest to policy-makers and government agencies involved in addressing 
money laundering and its successful detection and prosecution.  
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1   Introduction 
There are, generally speaking, two reasons why organisations and individuals may 
wish to launder money. First, to hide illegitimately acquired income or to avoid 
divulging activities which if closely scrutinised might reveal related illegal activities. 
Second, to hide legitimate income in order to avoid income tax in countries in which 
it is levied. If the extent of money laundering is extreme, then this represents a 
substantial threat to the revenue and economy of a country and possibly an untenable 
level of (probably organised) criminal activity. Therefore, it is in society’s interests to 
detect money laundering. Prevention of money laundering will arguably prevent loss 
of government revenue and will likely prevent or at least reduce criminal activity. 
Consequently, countries worldwide have legislated against money laundering. At 
the international level, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) developed the 40+9 
recommendations on anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism 
(AML/CFT) [1] in an attempt to provide a good governance framework. These 40+9 
recommendations are generally recognised as an international standard for 
implementing any AML/CFT system. Countries such as Australia, the UAE, the UK 
and the USA have reformulated their legislation and regulations to bring them into 
line with the FATF recommendations. Interestingly, these four countries among 
others have been identified by the United States’ (US) Department of State as major 
money laundering countries in 2008 [2]. To the authors knowledge this paper will be 
the first paper that compares a modern Islamic country such as the UAE with three 
modern western jurisdictions such as Australia, the UK and the USA. 
The work described in this paper focuses on these four countries for a number of 
reasons. The UAE has been selected as the funding for this research has been 
provided by the UAE1 and because the UAE, while a modern and rapidly developing 
economy, is an Islamic jurisdiction and thus to that extent distinctly different from the 
other three countries. Australia is included as the research has been undertaken in 
Australia while the UK has been selected because it is a jurisdiction representative of 
the European Community. Finally, the USA has been selected for a number of 
reasons, the principal being that as the world’s largest economy it needs to be 
included in any study of this sort. 
This paper analyses the differences in the AML/CFT systems of Australia, the 
UAE, the UK and the USA, and the extent to which they have interpreted and 
remained faithful to the FATF recommendations. The paper makes use of the FATF 
evaluation reports for Australia in 2005 [3], the UAE in 2007 [4], the UK in 2006 [5] 
and 2009 [6] and the USA in 2006 [7] to compare their compliance and discusses the 
local factors, such as cultural and economic factors, that have arguably affected the 
UAE’s compliance with the FATF recommendations. 
Section 2 analyses and compares the extent of compliance of these countries with 
the FATF recommendations. It also discusses the implications for non-compliant 
countries. Section 3 analyses how local factors have arguably affected the UAE’s 
compliance with the FATF recommendations. Section 4 presents our conclusions. 
2   Compliance with the FATF 40+9 Recommendations 
In the recent FATF evaluation of their AML/CFT systems, countries were required to 
submit follow-up reports indicating their progress with achieving compliance. 
Australia, the UK and the USA have reported back to the FATF. The only published 
follow-up report arising from these evaluations is one for the UK AML/CFT system 
which shows that the UK system has made substantial progress and has reached a 
satisfactory level of compliance with all the core and key recommendations2 including 
recommendation 5, which concerns “customer due diligence and record-keeping”. 
Follow-up reports for Australia and the USA are not available in the public domain at 
the time of writing. The UAE was to report to the FATF in March, 2010. Compliance 
with FATF recommendations is rated as follows: fully compliant (C), largely 
compliant (LC), partially compliant (PC) and non-compliant (NC). Compliance with 
each recommendation is measured against essential assessment criteria. This section 
                                                          
1 This research is funded by the Abu Dhabi Police, UAE. 
2 According to the FATF, the core recommendations are 1, 5, 10, 13, SR II, and SR IV, and the 
key recommendations are 3, 4, 23, 26, 35, 36, 40, SR I, SR III and SR V. 
compares how Australia, the UAE, the UK and the USA comply with the FATF 40 
recommendations (see Table 1). The section then proceeds to compare how these four 
countries comply with the FATF 9 special recommendations (see Table 2). 
2.1 Compliance with the FATF 40 Recommendations 
The FATF 40 recommendations on AML are categorised into four groups: (a) legal 
systems; (b) preventive measures; (c) institutional and other measures; and (d) 
international co-operation. 
Legal systems. The UK and the USA are fully or largely compliant with ‘Legal 
systems’ recommendations 1, 2 and 3. The UAE is largely compliant with two 
recommendations; however, it is only partially compliant with recommendation 1 
concerning money laundering offences. The FATF [4] indicated that the UAE has 
criminalised money laundering but the predicate offences in the law do not cover all 
types of serious offences such as drug trafficking and corruption, which is not 
completely in accordance with the FATF recommendations.  
Preventive measures. Australia is non-compliant with nine of the 22 
recommendations, and is only partially compliant with 8 other recommendations and 
in particular is non-compliant with the core recommendation 5 regarding customer 
due diligence. The FATF [3] noted that its customer due diligence is limited in its 
extent by not covering all varieties of financial institutions. Australia is only partially 
compliant with core recommendation 10 (record keeping) and key recommendation 
23 (financial sector supervision). The FATF noted that the AML/CFT (referred to as 
AML/CTF in Australia) supervisory system is not in accordance with its 
recommendations in relation to ensuring that financial institutions have an effective 
AML/CFT programme in place. 
The UAE is non-compliant with core recommendations 5 (customer due diligence) 
and 13 (suspicious transaction reporting), and it is only partially compliant with key 
recommendation 23. The FATF noted that there is no core customer due diligence 
obligations in any law or regulation of the UAE. It also found that there is no 
requirement in UAE law or regulation to report suspicious transactions related to 
financing of terrorism. The FATF found that there is a lack of a defined basis to 
recognise a transaction as suspicious. These deficiencies may in part be the result of 
the fact that UAE law does not impose customer due diligence obligations and does 
not clarify the UAE’s Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) responsibilities. 
The UK is largely or fully compliant with all core and key recommendations that 
address ‘Preventive measures’. However, it is non-compliant with recommendations 
6, 7 and 22 from this group. The FATF [5] indicated that there are no requirements 
within the UK AML/CFT system concerning the identification of politically exposed 
persons and noted that there are no requirements specified for financial institutions to 
collect information with regards to correspondent banking. 
In addition to being non-compliant with recommendations 12 and 16, the USA is 
only partially compliant with recommendation 5 concerning the establishment of 
customer due diligence. The FATF [7] found that there are no requirements for some 
cash dealers such as life insurance agents to establish customer due diligence, and 
generally there are no clear requirements to perform ongoing customer due diligence.  
Institutional and other measures. With regards to ‘Institutional and other measures’ 
recommendations 26-34, Australia is partially compliant with recommendations 29 
and 34. The FATF noted that Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre 
(AUSTRAC) powers of enforcement are limited to criminal sanctions and appear to 
be rarely applied. While the AML/CFT system of Australia has some problems in 
compliance with the previous recommendations, it is fully compliant with key 
recommendation 26. In contrast, the UAE system is partially compliant with 
recommendation 26 concerning the FIU. The FATF found that the UAE’s FIU has 
some problems in relation to collecting, analysing and disseminating suspicious 
activity reports. The FATF also noted that the UAE’s FIU does not publish annual 
reports with statistics concerning its activities. It is difficult to find information in 
relation to the number of suspicious transactions reported each year in the UAE, as we 
found in a separate work [8]. The UK AML/CFT system is partially compliant with 
recommendations 33 and 34. The FATF noted that the UK system does not have 
sufficient measures to identify accurate information concerning beneficial ownership3. 
The USA AML/CFT system has some problems in compliance with 
recommendations 33 and 34. The FATF indicated that the US system does not have 
adequate measures in place to make sure that there is accurate information available 
in relation to the beneficial ownership. 
International co-operation. With regards to recommendations 35-40, Australia, the 
UK and the USA are fully or largely compliant with these recommendations. In 
contrast, the UAE is less compliant than the other countries. It is partially compliant 
with recommendations 38 and key recommendation 40. It is expected that the UAE 
will address these areas of deficiencies. The main deficiency is that there are no legal 
provisions that define how confidential information will be shared with other foreign 
counterparts.  
In summary, and as shown in Table 1, the USA followed by the UK appear to be 
most advanced in terms of compliance with the FATF 40 recommendations, with the 
UAE being least compliant.  
Table 1 Summary of compliance with the FATF 40 recommendations on AML 
Country Fully compliant (C) 
Largely 
compliant (LC) 
Total 
(C+LC) 
Partially 
compliant (PC) 
Non compliant 
(NC) 
Total 
(PC+NC) 
Australia 12 9 21 10 9 19 
UAE 5 12 17 16 7 23 
UK 19 10 29 8 3 11 
USA 12 22 34 2 4 6 
                                                          
3 By beneficial ownership it is meant the enjoyment by anyone who has the benefits of 
ownership of a security or a property and yet nominally does not own the actual asset.  
2.2 Compliance with the FATF 9 Special Recommendations 
This section compares compliance with the FATF 9 special recommendations on 
Combating Financing of Terrorism (CFT). The FATF simultaneously evaluated the 
CFT and Anti-Money Laundering (AML) systems in Australia, the UAE, the UK and 
the USA. Table 2 illustrates a summary by country of compliance with the FATF 9 
special recommendations on CFT. Once again, the USA followed by the UK appear 
to be most advanced in terms of compliance, with the UAE being least compliant. 
Table 2 Summary of compliance with the FATF 9 special recommendations on CFT 
Country Fully compliant (C) 
Largely 
compliant (LC) 
Total 
(C+LC) 
Partially 
compliant (PC) 
Non compliant 
(NC) 
Total 
(PC+NC) 
Australia - 5 5 3 1 4 
UAE - 3 3 2 4 6 
UK 5 3 8 1 - 1 
USA 3 6 9 - - - 
 
Australia, the UK and the USA are either compliant or largely compliant with the 
core and key special recommendations. In contrast, the UAE is non-compliant with 
core special recommendation IV concerning suspicious transaction reporting. The 
UAE is only partially compliant with the key special recommendation I regarding 
implementing the 1999 UN International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism, and the key special recommendation III regarding imposing 
effective laws for freezing and confiscation of funds used for financing of terrorism. 
2.3 Implications of Non-Compliance with FATF 
Overall, Australia is non-compliant or partially compliant with three core and key 
recommendations (5, 10 and 23). The UAE is non-compliant or partially compliant 
with nine core and key recommendations (1, 5, 13, 23, 26, 40, SR I, SR III and SR 
IV). The USA is only partially compliant with core recommendation 5. This finding 
suggests that there are additional steps that need to be taken by Australia, the UAE 
and the USA to address the identified deficiencies. The UAE, in particular, needs to 
do more work to ensure that its AML/CFT system is effectively implemented in 
accordance with the FATF recommendations. 
Non-compliance with the FATF recommendations has negative implications for a 
country and its relations with other countries. The implications of non-compliance 
include the increased risk of exploiting a country’s financial system for criminal 
purposes by organised criminals and terrorists, with consequent implications for a 
country’s economy, society and victims of crime [52]. There are also specific 
implications of non-compliance with respect to dealing with countries which are 
compliant. To protect its interests and minimise risk, a compliant country may impose 
tough regulations in dealing with non-compliant countries. A non-compliant country 
can face obstacles from international organisations and other compliant countries, 
obstacles such as discouraging foreign investment, trade and relationships, and 
damaging reputations with international organisations such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF (2009) [9] noted that “money 
laundering and terrorist financing activities can undermine the integrity and stability 
of financial institutions and systems, discourage foreign investment, and distort 
international capital flows”. 
There are other implications. A non-compliant country may not be able to provide 
international law enforcement with useful information such as customer identification 
and transactions records to assist in tracing the origins of transaction monies. In 2009, 
the G20 Working Group on Reinforcing International Cooperation and Promoting 
Integrity in Financial Markets [10] indicated that countries should implement 
measures that protect the global financial system from uncooperative or non-
compliant countries with FATF recommendations that create risks of illicit financial 
system. In conclusion, non-compliance with the FATF recommendation means a 
heightened risk for a country’s financial systems, reputation, and its interests in 
dealing with other countries in an extremely globalised world. 
3   Factors Affecting Compliance 
The previous section analysed and compared the extent of compliance of the USA, 
the UK, Australia and the UAE with the FATF AML/CFT recommendations. The 
UAE is the least compliant with the AML/CFT recommendations which is perhaps 
not surprising. The FATF requirements presuppose the existence of a sophisticated 
good governance environment and an advanced information technology (IT) 
infrastructure being established. Good corporate governance is a western creation that 
relies in the modern environment on the availability of appropriate human resources 
and developed policies and procedures, and ethical standards, together with audit 
capability and capacity. This may not be readily available in a developing economy at 
a stage in advancing its specific economy in a global environment. The compliance 
obligation to FATF may require some compromise when it comes to a non-western 
economy but such compromise must not open the door to criminal elements to 
launder money at the expense of other jurisdictions. This section examines some of 
the underlying cultural considerations and culture-specific ethical issues that affect 
the extent of the UAE compliance, and how cultural and ethical considerations may 
affect good governance and the establishment of shared codes of practice. This 
examination covers religious, cultural, socio-economic and financial factors that 
appear to be important in the case of the UAE. 
3.1 Ethical Behaviour, Good Governance and Culture  
The Internet has brought to the fore and highlighted many new situations fraught with 
ethical considerations. These considerations arise because the Internet provides so 
many options for communication and options to access global information resources 
from a single point of access. It is exactly this power and its potential for misuse that 
has attracted the attention of national and international organisations interested in the 
use of the Internet for the common good. Of specific note in this regard is SIG9.2.2 
[11], the IFIP Special Interest Group on a Framework for Ethics of Computing, which 
has been working in this domain for 20 years and which in 1999 published an 
influential monograph that has direct relevance to the work described in this paper, 
“Ethics and the Governance of the Internet” [12]. It is likewise the opportunities 
provided by the Internet that are exploited by money launderers, giving rise to the 
evocative phrase “the big cyber-laundering machine” [13].  
One of the most pervasive ethical considerations highlighted by global information 
access concerns the tension between the need for privacy and anonymity on the one 
hand and the need for accountability on the other [14, 15]. This particular conflict of 
course transcends national and cultural boundaries, but balancing privacy and 
anonymity against accountability is pivotal in attempts to combat money laundering 
globally [14]. As discussed below and in sections 3.2 and 3.3, it presents an especially 
acute challenge for emerging and developing economies. The UAE at least is 
progressively addressing the issue.  
AML presents a prime example of this conflict between privacy (and anonymity) 
and accountability, at both the international level where AML efforts rely on 
identifying the nature of trans-national financial transactions, and also at the local 
level where identifying suspicious transactions is reliant on reports to the relevant 
national FIU. There are of course other IT-related ethical issues which are just as 
relevant but here the focus will be culture-specific. For example, the role of women in 
society differs markedly across cultures and this relates at a practical level to issues 
such as the ‘digital divide’ – not between developing and developed states in this 
case, but within communities – and open access to the Internet. Open access to the 
Internet is a point of focus [12]. 
In Section 3.3 we examine the role played by the Hawala system in the UAE which 
differentiates it from the other three jurisdictions analysed. Hawala is an honour-
based system which is pervasive in many Islamic economies throughout the world. It 
is used to transfer money or value between people in a local community without any 
interaction with financial institutions. It has virtually no parallel in western culture 
and presents a direct challenge to AML efforts. In the case of the UAE, this challenge 
is addressed through a Hawala broker registration scheme which is, however, still 
voluntary.  
There is another, more complex, example of cross-cultural difference with 
significant underlying ethical considerations which is examined in Section 3.2. It 
relates directly to the fight against terrorism on the one hand and society’s obligation 
to provide for the needy on the other. Crimm [16] indicates that implementing the 
FATF strict standards on AML/CFT can affect the effectiveness and the remit of 
Islamic charities, and consequently ‘cut off’ financial support to the needy. This issue 
does not arise in western culture where company legislation and income tax 
legislation have historically resulted in careful regulation of charitable institutions.  
These two examples illustrate some of the difficulties that face the international 
community in establishing internationally shared and accepted codes of practice. 
While establishing principles of good governance is paramount, whether with respect 
to AML or with regard to international financial markets or whatever, the difficulty is 
in the detail. In other words, establishing principles of good governance will most 
likely involve the reconciliation of local cultural and ethical differences if there is to 
be internationally shared and accepted codes of practice. This could involve 
compromise so as to accommodate cultural differences and ethical standards. The 
case of the UAE’s progressive alignment with FATF is a salutary example of such 
reconciliation.  
These dilemmas lead naturally to questions regarding the advantages and 
disadvantages, and the feasibility in general, of constructing a single international 
framework based on a consensus of divergent views. There is evidently no easy way 
to do so. Experience shows that building such a consensus is a slow process, and it is 
important to accept this at the outset of such attempts, in order to avoid premature 
acceptance of failure. Success requires a willingness of all parties to cooperate and to 
reconcile differences. Experience also shows that the path to global consensus 
requires the participation not only of champion international agencies but also of local 
and regional bodies as well as other stakeholders. The latter is paradoxically made 
possible by the nature of the Internet – its global nature, the very issue that prompts 
attempts to achieve the consensus – and the vested interests of non-regulatory, 
commercial stakeholders. Two recent examples of achieving some degree of such a 
consensus through regional bodies are the reconciliation of the European Union (EU) 
and USA approaches to the protection of privacy [12] and cooperation between FATF 
and regional FATF-style bodies (APG, CFATF, MONEYVAL, GAFISUD, 
MENAFATF, EAG, ESAAMLG, GIABA4) [17]. The work undertaken by the FATF 
and the FATF-style regional bodies facilitates similar or comparable approaches for 
implementing AML/CFT systems. While the FATF recommendations are in many 
cases not fully implemented by the member countries, these recommendations are still 
considered as an important framework for countries to use in order to counter money 
laundering and terrorist financing. The focus here is to observe the advantages that the 
FATF experience creates for proceeding towards a harmonised AML/CFT system and 
how it has succeeded in bringing these different countries and organisations to agree 
in principle on international standards for AML/CFT systems. 
3.2   Religious and Cultural Factors 
The UAE’s culture has developed from a strong belief in Islam which governs 
people’s way of life, behaviour and decisions [18]. This has had a significant impact 
on UAE culture. The UAE culture is accordingly in many ways significantly different 
from the culture in Australia, the UK and the USA. 
The founding members of the FATF – which did not include the UAE – such as 
Australia, the UK and the USA, have unavoidably left their cultural imprint on the 
organisation and its operations. This has some natural consequences when it comes to 
FATF evaluations. Johnston and Carrington (2006) [19] indicate that there is a 
problem when the FATF do a mutual assessment evaluation of the AML/CFT systems 
in member countries. This problem is how to implement FATF standards that have 
been structured in the context of developed economies and apply them to the financial 
markets of emerging and developing economies. These developing economies [19] 
typically comprise a substantially different culture and history to that of developed 
economies. Johnston and Carrington note that trying to impose measures which are 
                                                          
4 The full titles of all these organisations are given on the Members and Observers page of the 
FATF website. 
unsuitable for developing countries may lead to non-compliance with the FATF 
standards [19]. Kanatas and Stefanadis (2005) [20] note that culture and legal systems 
support each other and that economic development and financial structures are 
affected not only by a country’s legal system but also by its culture. They show that 
the development of a country’s legal and financial systems is related to its religious 
beliefs. They note that culture is “the engine of economic prosperity and growth and a 
critical factor in the development of financial markets”. When people talk about 
culture, they talk about a way of life, what people believe, and how they apply that to 
develop their regulations, organisations and institutions. Kwok and Tadesse (2005) 
[21] argue that countries differ in the configuration of their financial systems because 
they are different in terms of their national cultures.  
According to the US Department of State (2007), Islam is practiced by 96% of the 
population in the UAE [22], making it a dominant influence on the country. Islam 
prohibits any activity funded by money derived from unlawful trade or ill-gotten 
property and prohibits using illegal money for charities [23]. Money gained from 
gambling and bank interest is prohibited in Islam [23]. This is in marked contrast to 
normal practice in Australia, the UK and the USA. 
While there is no income tax in the UAE, Muslims are required as a part of their 
religion to “[fulfill] the God right through paying money ‘Zakat’ to charities or to the 
needy people” [23]. Charities play an important role in Muslim practices. Crimm 
(2008) [16] noted that “as Islam places a high value on compassion, wealth 
redistributions, social justice, and supporting and enhancing fellow humans, both 
philanthropy and charity play crucial roles for Muslims and their civil societies”. The 
FATF special recommendation VIII indicates that countries should have effective 
laws and regulations concerning non-profit organisations that can be misused for the 
financing of terrorism including taking a risk-based approach that identifies the aims 
of the organisation, its size and the amount of money it handles [1, 24]. The challenge 
is in identifying what kind of activities constitutes terrorism and whether financing 
some such activities would be considered as the financing of terrorism. The World 
Bank (2006) [25] noted that while countries have agreed on combating the financing 
of terrorism, the “meaning of terrorism is not universally accepted due to significant 
political, religious and national implications that differ from country to country”. 
Crimm [16] indicated that implementing the FATF strict standards on AML/CFT 
could affect the extent of Muslim charities and consequently effectively ‘cut off’ 
financial support to the needy. Many countries such as the UAE have imposed some 
obligations on charitable organisations to protect them from misuse. All charitable 
organisations in the UAE are regulated and monitored by the Ministry of Social 
Affairs [2]. The UAE also specifies legitimate channels for charities to transfer money 
outside the country in order to minimise possible use of these funds for illegal 
purposes. In 2002, the UAE government regulated that all licensed charitable 
organisations wishing to transfer money overseas, must do so through either: the Red 
Crescent Authority, the Zayed Charitable Foundation, or the Muhammad Bin Rashid 
Charitable Trust [2]. This allows people to make charitable donations whose 
destination can be monitored. 
Islam’s prohibition of bank interest means that an important service provided by 
Islamic banking is the buying and selling of goods without interest. For example, if a 
person wants to buy a car, they do not give the money directly to the seller. Instead, 
the bank buys the car and resells it to the buyer/ bank customer. This practice is called 
Murabaha [26] and is pervasive throughout the UAE banking sector. It is noted that 
while some non-Islamic banks in Australia for instance have started to recognise the 
need for such services, this is again in marked contrast to normal practice in Australia, 
the UK and the USA. 
The UAE is a cash-based economy in which carrying large cash amounts is a 
normal practice and this makes it more difficult to impose requirements concerning 
reporting large cash transactions. Imposing regulations (for instance, requiring all 
large transactions to be reported) in such circumstances is very difficult if not 
impossible. While many consider this to be a good cultural trait, it is problematic for 
the purpose of analysing the money cycle. Finally, the UAE is a society based on 
strong homogeneity [27] which is characterised by strong extended family 
relationships and close family ties [28]. There is a concern here especially when 
applying the FATF standards that relate to customer due diligence. For instance, if a 
person goes to a bank to conduct a transaction and finds that he/she knows the bank’s 
employee, it is quite likely that the employee will not undertake due diligence 
procedures. (In fact, this practice is not limited to only the UAE culture although it is 
considerably more prevalent in the UAE than some other countries. Bedi and Acharya 
(2005) [29] note that personal relationships “can lead to poor compliance [with AML] 
standards as many US Private Banks have found out”.) In the UAE, carrying large 
sums of cash and purchasing properties and expensive products by cash is normal [4]. 
The US Department of State [2] noted that according to the UAE, “[c]ustoms 
officials, police, and judicial authorities tend to not regard large cash imports as 
potentially suspicious or criminal type activities, arguing that the UAE is a cash-based 
economy, and it is not unusual for people to carry significant sums of cash”.  
3.3   Socio-economic and Financial Factors 
The US Department of State (2007) indicates that oil makes up most of the UAE 
export earnings and it dominates the economy [22]. Oil provides wealth to the country 
and its people. 
One of the socio-economic factors that affects the UAE financial system and 
differentiates it from the three other countries in this study is the use of the Hawala 
system. The Hawala system is used to transfer money or value between people in a 
local community without any interaction with financial institutions. Viles (2008) [30] 
defines Hawala as “a system by which people in geographically remote areas can give 
things of value to each other, without the physical (and, now, without the electronic) 
conveyance of money”. The UAE has established regulations in relation to Hawala 
which require that Hawaladars should register themselves and then they are 
recognized as Hawala Brokers [31]. The UAE intends to ensure that the Hawala 
brokers provide details of money transfers and report any suspicious transfers. The 
registration is still voluntary and UAE authorities have no legal power to examine 
Hawaladars for non-compliance. 
Australia, the UK and the USA are all recognised as developed economies, while 
the UAE is an emerging economy. In the UAE, in contrast to Australia, the UK and 
the USA, there is no tax on income and this has at least two interesting implications. 
The first is that the motivation for money laundering in order to achieve tax avoidance 
is absent. The second is that the cycle of money is harder to trace as a result of not 
having to report income. The obligatory reporting of income in other countries 
enables the flow of money to be more easily followed. While the UAE requires 
financial institutions to report any transactions that are unusually large for a given 
account with no legal purpose or reasonable or economic grounds [32], there is no 
general requirement to report income by companies or by individuals. 
The financial systems in Australia, the UK and the USA are very similar and are 
dominated by their stock markets [21] and although UAE financial systems have 
some similarities with these countries, there are important differences. These 
differences play an important role in how the country implements its AML/CFT 
system. 
3.3   Summary 
It is inevitable that achieving the good governance requirements implicit in the FATF 
recommendations is difficult; this is due at least in part to different ethical and 
cultural values internationally. It is nonetheless of paramount importance in 
combating money laundering, terrorism and organised criminal activity to address this 
challenge; doing so requires a careful, country by country, consideration of local 
factors and values. Overall, in the context of the four countries examined in this study, 
it is submitted that further steps are needed by both the UAE and the FATF in order to 
achieve a higher degree of compliance with the FATF recommendations. 
4   Conclusion 
This paper has investigated the implementation of the FATF recommendations by 
Australia, the UAE, the UK and the USA. Gaps in compliance were identified for the 
core and key recommendations for three of the four countries studied and the analysis 
indicates that there are additional steps that need to be taken by Australia, the UAE 
and the USA to address the identified deficiencies. The AML/CFT system of the UAE 
in particular is least compliant with the recommendations. The paper has examined 
some of the underlying cultural considerations, and culture-specific and ethical issues 
that affect the extent of the UAE compliance, and how cultural and ethical 
considerations may affect good governance in general and the establishment of shared 
codes of practice. The paper has examined religious, cultural, socio-economic and 
financial factors that appear to be important in the case of the UAE. These factors 
represent a real challenge to any country such as the UAE when implementing its 
regulations and financial institutions. Given the global and widespread nature of 
money laundering, it is vital that local and international communities cooperate to 
meet these challenges. 
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